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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM : Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security
SUBJECT : Reduction of Office of Security Hard
Copy Records (MBO Objective OS-D 01-76)

1. This memorandum is for information only
2. The Office of Security, pursuant to OS-D 01-76, has developed a plan to reduce by at least 10% the total volume of Office hard copy records. This plan is set forth in detail below.

3. MBO Objective OS-D 01-76 states as follows:
"By 31 December 1976, complete a study and propose a plan to reduce by at least 10% the total volume of Office hard copy records as measured in the FY 1975 records management inventory. Such reduction would be carried out by identifying types of material that must be permanently collected and by identifying for destruction duplicate and other unnecessary file material so that its legal destruction could be accomplished as soon as authorization is granted following the conclusion of current investigations of Agency activities." To track this objective, four milestones were established as follows:

a. Milestone 1: Identify types and volume of records held by Office of Security components. To accomplish this milestone, each component was requested to review its file inventory, identify all types of file holdings and submit estimated volumes of each. The total volume of records identified by this activity was in harmony with the volume of records inventoried in our July 1975 Records Volume Inventory, approximately 13,800 cubic feet. This milestone was accomplished as scheduled on 30 September 1975.

b. Milestone 2: Categorize each record type as (a) must be kept by law, directive or regulation; (b) must be destroyed; (c) should be kept and, (d) should be destroyed. Individual Office of Security components categorized their records and, except for Security Records Division (SRD), measured the volume in each category. SRD, which holds approximately 11,000 cubic feet of files, was unable to estimate the volume in each category due to the enormity and diversity of its inventory.

(1) The total volume in each category of files held within Polygraph Branch, the second most voluminous collection of files outside SRD, is as follows:

(a) Must be kept by law, directive

or regulation-----337*

(b) Must be destroyed----- 0

(c) Should be kept----- 53

(d) Should be destroyed-----228*

TOTAL 618 Cubic Feet

(2) The total volume in each category of files held by all other offices is as follows:

(a) Must be kept by law, directive or regulation-----463**

(b) Must be destroyed----- 0

(c) Should be kept-----1586

(d) Should be destroyed----- 151

TOTAL 2200 Cubic Feet

(3) With the exception of SRD's lack of volume measurements for each category of records, which it has been determined is not feasible, Milestone 2 was completed as scheduled on 31 October 1975.

c. Milestone 3: Identify problems, priorities and options for carrying out destruction and estimate resources required. File reduction within all

NOTE: * These figures are estimates based upon our anticipation that the purge of polygraph subject files will result in a 40% reduction in the volume of current subject file holdings. This purge activity is discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this paper.

** This figure represents primarily security dossiers in process or being held by offices outside SRD and certain office policy and administrative files.

offices outside SRD and Polygraph Branch can be accomplished with a minimum of effort and with current resources. No particular priorities or problems are identifiable with the purge of these holdings.

(1) Polygraph Files: Approximately 565 cubic feet of Polygraph files are stored within Polygraph Branch. It is estimated that approximately 40% or 228 cubic feet of this inventory can be purged under recently revised retention criteria. No increase in resources is necessary to effect this purge.

(2) Security Dossiers: The inventory of files in Security Records Division as measured in the July 1975 Records Volume Inventory approximates 11,000 cubic feet or approximately 80% of all Office of Security holdings. There are several problems associated with the purge of this vast inventory, foremost of which is resources. Examination of the resource problem suggests 4 options.

(a) Option No 1 involves the development and training of a special purge team consisting of a sufficient number of personnel to ensure expeditious progress. As an example, such a team would consist of a maximum of thirteen personnel at the following grade levels: one GS-13; six GS-11s; two GS-06s; and four GS-05s. An intensive training course would have to be developed and administered to the team members before actual purging would begin. The estimated cost of these resources is \$215,000 per annum. Option No. 1 would require an estimated two years to complete.

(b) Option No. 2 would employ the special team concept but on a smaller scale. Such a team consisting of five personnel; one GS-12; two GS-06s; and two GS-05s, could prove effective, however, more time would be required to effect the purge and over a longer term the costs probably would approximate that of the larger team above. This team would also have to undergo a period of training. The estimated cost of this team is \$68,000 per annum. Option No. 2 would require an estimated six years to complete.

(c) Option No.3 would entail the actual temporary termination of an ongoing Office of Security program and redirecting resources therein to

the purge effort.

The Microfiche and Retirement Branch of SRD, consisting of eleven personnel, appears to be a potential candidate. Its personnel are sufficient in number to ensure an expeditious purge; its personnel are also familiar with security dossiers and have already engaged in some file purge activity in connection with the preparation of files for microfiching. Implementation of this option would incur no increase in resources, only a redirection of existing resources. It is estimated that Option No. 3 would require two years and nine months to complete.

(e) Option No. 4 would consist of reviewing each document or file that is retrieved as a result of routine usage and purging materials that do not meet retention criteria. Over a period of many years, Security Records Division files would be purged of appropriate material using this method. It is, however, the least effective of the stated options from the standpoint of timeliness and thoroughness.

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categorized our records holdings into three groups: "personal" and "impersonal" security dossiers, by far the bulk of our holdings; polygraph files, the largest accumulation of files held by an office outside SRD; and those files held by all other offices. Our reduction plan with reference to each group is set forth below. Attached are charts reflecting proposed purge schedules applicable to each of these groups of holdings. With particular reference to SRD holdings it will be noted that four charts have been prepared corresponding to each of the four options cited above. As noted earlier, Option No. 3 is recommended.

5. Security Records Division

a. Security Records Division controls by far the bulk of Office of Security files as reflected dramatically in the June 1975 Records Volume Inventory. Of the 13,707 cubic feet of files inventoried, 11,109 cubic feet, or approximately 80% belong to SRD. Thus, SRD represents the most conspicuous single source for file reduction potential. It also poses the greatest problem due to the enormity of its inventory and the necessity for purging corresponding index entries.

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(a) Employee Files: Destroy 30 years after date of last action in the file all employee files and all other security case files except those listed below.

(b) Exploratory Investigative Files: Destroy three years following the date of last action any file which was established for exploratory investigation to develop biographic information, a current address, etc., when the file does not reflect any follow-up contact or use of the individual by the Agency; destroy five years following the date of last action in the file if such file contains a follow-up investigation but no subsequent contact or use of the individual by the Agency. Included would be those files containing requests for Provisional Operational Approvals, Provisional Covert Security Approvals, Provisional Proprietary Approvals, Industrial Approvals for Contact at the Secret level (ad hocs), and Special Inquiries.

(c) Indigenous Employees of Overseas Agency Personnel: Destroy five years following the date of last action any file which contains a request for security processing of personnel to be employed by overseas Agency employees where there is no noteworthy information in the file. Many such files have been established on maids, house-boys, gardeners, chauffeurs, etc. (This category does not include files on indigenous personnel who were or are employees of a Station or Base.)

(d) Alien or Citizen Contacts: Destroy ten years following the date of last action any file on alien contacts or citizen contacts when those files contain no noteworthy information.

(e) Employees of Contracting Firms



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(f) Liaison Personnel: Destroy five years following the date of last action any file concerned only with liaison clearances (for contact with personnel of other U. S. Government agencies).

(g) Personnel of Firms ^{Having} ~~WHICH HAD~~ SECRET Contract with the Agency: Destroy ten years following the date of last action any file containing information on employees of firms which had Secret contracts with the Agency (Industrial Security Secret Clearances) when the file contains no derogatory information.

(h) Personnel of Firms ^{With} ~~WHICH HAD~~ TOP SECRET or "Compartmented" Contracts with the Agency: Destroy fifteen years following the date of last action any file containing information on employees of firms with TOP SECRET or "Compartmented" contracts with the Agency (Industrial Top

Secret Clearances on Special Access Approvals) when the file contains no derogatory information.

(i) Employee Applicants - Never Hired:

Destroy fifteen years following date of last action any file established on an applicant for employment when there is an indication that the individual was never hired by the Agency and when the file contains no derogatory information.

(j) Employees of Firms Which Constructed "New" Headquarters Building: Destroy immediately any file on an employee of contracting firms involved in the construction of the "new" Headquarters Building.



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
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(l) Files Holding Public Media Information:

Destroy immediately any file found which was established to hold magazine articles, newspaper clippings or other such materials from public media, or summaries thereof, when there is no documented request for Office of Security processing of the individual.

(m) Files Containing "Dissident" Information:

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
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(5) Useless and Duplicative Material:



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(b) A comprehensive listing has been compiled of over 300 forms, reports, and memoranda traditionally filed in security dossiers. From this list will be prepared a guide for a purge team to identify material to be purged, e.g., buck slips, and routing sheets lacking substantive notes; non-Office of Security forms clearly duplicated in files held by other offices of primary interest, and certain forms and file material which have a short-term purpose.

(6) The volume of files within SRD these programs will identify for destruction is unpredictable but should represent a significant portion of our 10% Office-wide destruction goal.

6. Polygraph Branch Files

a. Under the current system, files are kept on all operational and non-operational polygraph cases for 35 years whether or not they contain reportable information. Operational and non-operation cases which do contain reportable information are currently stored in Polygraph Branch; approximately 565 cubic feet. Non-operational files lacking reportable information are periodically sent to the Records Center for storage. Approximately 242 cubic feet of these files are estimated currently at the Records Center.

b. Each polygraph file is composed of the following: 1) a polygraph agreement; 2) a question sheet; 3) the examiner's notes; 4) charts; 5) the technical analysis sheet and 6) the polygraph report. Some files have such material covering more than one polygraph testing.

c. As an adjunct to the case file, a three-way card index by true name, cryptonym, if any, and case number is maintained.

d. The following procedure, utilizing existing resources, will be implemented to effect the reduction of polygraph file holdings.

(1) All polygraph files held within the Branch through CY 1965 will be purged of all materials except the polygraph report and technical analysis sheet. These latter materials will be retained and temporarily stored in an available storage area outside the Branch. It is estimated that those materials which may be purged from this category of polygraph files represent approximately 40% of the Branch's file inventory.

(2) With the support of SRD resources, the Polygraph Branch index will be searched against SRD indices to identify the names of persons who have resigned, retired, are deceased, disapproved for employment or have no further contact with the Agency. These files, estimated at spanning 1965 through 1974, will also be purged except for the report and technical analysis sheet which will be boxed and stored as above.

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(3) The remaining files, so-called active files covering 1965 to the present, will be retained to toto in Polygraph Branch office space. An annual program will be implemented to cut off these files at ten years, reduce the report and data sheet to microform and destroy the remaining material.

(4) Those file materials which are to be retained and stored temporarily in available space elsewhere in Headquarters Building will be placed on microform in the near future and returned to Polygraph Branch. The type of

microform to be employed, i.e. reel microfilm or microfiche card, must be fully examined in conjunction with the Micrographics Branch, ISAS, and the Printing and Photography Division, to establish which mode is most appropriate to our requirement and to ascertain cost factors. Thus, as part of our overall plan, we will request a formal evaluation of these options by Micrographics Branch and rely heavily upon their guidance and expertise in reaching our decision.

(5) It is noted that a pending renovation of Polygraph Branch office space will dramatically compress file storage capabilities. The above procedures will ensure a significant reduction in file holdings which is not only responsive to our reduction objective but also consistent with anticipated reduced storage capabilities.

(6) Polygraph files retired to the Records Center will be destroyed as all are clear cases containing no reportable information.

7. Agency Working Group on Files on Americans

An Agency Working Group was established on 21 January 1976 pursuant to Management Committee approval of an IG recommendation that the Agency take a coordinated approach in developing maintenance and purge criteria for files on American citizens. An Office of Security representative was assigned to this Group to address this program within the Office of Security. The Working Group pinpointed several files within the Office of Security.

which should be destroyed when the moratorium on destruction is lifted. These files are: 1)

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8. All Other Offices

a. All other offices within the Office of Security should be able to administer their individual reductions with

a minimum of effort and disruption of Office routine, as each has either segregated or is in the process of segregating those files which should be destroyed.

b. Upon termination of the destruction moratorium and amendment of appropriate Records Control Schedules, if appropriate, we will instruct these offices to proceed with the destruction of appropriate files. We will allow 30 days to complete this destruction.

c. Those offices encountering difficulties in storing those files identified for destruction will be advised of their option to retain them in office space or transfer them to the Records Center for destruction following the moratorium. Any office electing to send file to the Records Center will be provided appropriate instruction to effect the transfer.

9. Preventive Medicine

a. A most difficult problem to be faced is that of employee inertia and the tendency to retain files and file material of questionable value. To help mitigate this problem we will publish a vigorous Office of Security Directive designed to motivate personnel to discard the packrat syndrome both with respect to their own component files and SRD files which they may use in the course of their duties.

b. Emphasis will be placed upon reducing the retention periods of all Office of Security records. This will be accomplished through a comprehensive revision of the Office of Security Records Control Schedule scheduled for completion by 31 August 1976.

c. To preclude the long-term accumulation of useless and duplicative material, we will initiate an annual program as a prelude to our annual Record Volume Inventory to identify and destroy such material. This will help keep office files reasonably lean.

10. Records Reduction Figures

In order to keep track of the volume of files destroyed, each office will report its records reduction figures on a timely basis to Chief, Policy and Plans Group. While the compilation of accurate reduction figures is essential in determining the success of this proposed plan, it is noted that the acid test of our overall records program, which should accent the need for reduced holdings, is the annual Records Volume Inventory. This inventory, taken at the end of each fiscal year, will indicate our success in permanently reducing the volume of our record holdings.

11. Summary

Security Records Division controls the bulk of Office of Security files and represents the greatest single source for reduction potential. Option 3 which entails redirecting existing resources to the purge program promises to be the most practical and economical from the standpoint

of resources. Employing option 3, a target date of 30 June 1979 has been established to complete the purge. The Polygraph Branch should be able to significantly reduce its file holdings by 30 September 1977 through the selective purging of polygraph file materials. All other offices should be able to manage their individual reduction program with a minimum of effort and within 30 days of the lifting of the destruction moratorium and amendment of appropriate records schedules.

Robert W. Gambino

SECURITY RECORDS DIVISION PURGE SCHEDULE OPTION 1

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
1. Establish purge team.	FY 77 *											
2. Document authorities, responsibilities and procedures.		FY 77 *										
3. Complete training of purge team.		FY 77 *										
4. Begin initial production.			FY 77 *									
5. Establish production targets.					FY 77 *							
6. Review production statistics, adjust production targets or resources, if necessary.										FY 77 *		
7. Conclude purge program.												FY 78 *

Resources: one GS-13 Costs Per Annum: \$215,000
 six GS-11s
 two GS-06s
 four GS-05s

SECURITY RECORDS DIVISION PURGE SCHEDULE OPTION 2

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
1. Establish purge team.	FY*77											
2. Document authorities, responsibilities and procedures.		FY 77 *										
3. Complete training of purge team.		FY*77										
4. Begin initial production.			FY*77									
5. Establish production targets.											FY*77	
6. Review production statistics. Adjust production targets or resources, if necessary.				FY*78								
7. Review again production statistics. Adjust production targets or resources, if necessary.									FY 78 *			
8. Conclude purge.												FY 82 *

Resources: one GS-12
two GS-06s
two GS-05s

Cost Per Annum: \$68,000

SECURITY RECORDS DIVISION PURGE SCHEDULE OPTION 3

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
1. Terminate microfiche program and establish purge team.	FY*77											
2. Document authorities, responsibilities and procedures.		FY 77 *										
3. Complete training of purge team.		FY 77 *										
4. Begin initial production.			FY*77									
5. Establish production targets.					FY*77							
6. Review production statistics, adjust production targets or resources, if necessary.											FY 77 *	
7. Conclude purge program.									FY 79 *			

Resources (existing): one GS-11
one GS-09
one GS-08
one GS-07
three GS-06s
four GS-05s

Costs Per Annum: \$153,000

SECURITY RECORDS DIVISION PURGE SCHEDULE OPTION 4

Option 4 is a long-term option which entails the review and purge of security files retrieved as a result of routine usage. As such, this option does not lend itself to meaningful scheduling. Suffice it to say that such a program could require a decade or two to bring about a significant purge of SRD holdings.

Ideally, implementation of option 4 should be a follow on to an intensive purge program to ensure, maintenance wise, that files are kept lean and clean.

POLYGRAPH BRANCH PURGE SCHEDULE

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
1. Assign personnel who will engage in purge.								FY 76 *				
2. Assign each personnel specific blocks of files to be reviewed.								FY 76 *				
3. Begin identification and segregation of file materials to be purged.									FY 76 *			
4. Complete purge.												FY 77 *

RESOURCES: No additional resources necessary.
Program uses existing resources.

"ALL OTHER OFFICES" PURGE SCHEDULE

The purge of records within all other offices (which excludes Security Records Division and Polygraph Branch) can be accomplished within 30 days after the lifting of the destruction moratorium. No additional resources are necessary.